Hardware Pentest of a Smart Meter
The Challenge
The provider needed confidence that a smart meter could withstand an attacker with hands-on access while continuing to protect its firmware, cryptographic material, readings, and control functions.
A useful assessment had to go beyond a software scan: it needed physical inspection in the lab, firmware and update analysis, and testing of the device's communications and connected software as one attack surface.
“NodeRisk followed the same path a determined attacker would, from the circuit board and debug interfaces into the firmware and connected software. The findings gave our engineering team clear fixes we could validate.”
The Execution
Threat model
We reviewed hardware revisions, firmware builds, documentation, accessories, and connected services, then defined safe test boundaries and attacker goals.
Physical lab analysis
In our lab, we disassembled the meter, mapped components and trust boundaries, and tested accessible UART, JTAG, SWD, storage, and other debug paths.
Firmware & software analysis
We extracted and reversed the firmware, then assessed boot and update controls, key storage, device protocols, APIs, and connected management software.
Validate & retest
We chained hardware and software weaknesses into safe proof-of-concept attacks, prioritized fixes, and retested the hardened build.
The Outcome
The provider received one prioritized view of risks across the circuit board, firmware, and connected software, with reproducible evidence for each finding.
The engagement produced a repeatable security acceptance test for future hardware revisions, firmware builds, and connected-software releases.