Global pharmaceuticals & biotech company · name withheld

Red Teaming a Pharmaceuticals & Biotech Company

The Challenge

The company had invested heavily in a security operations center, endpoint detection, and identity controls, but had never measured how those defenses would fare against a determined adversary targeting its research pipeline and clinical data.

Leadership wanted an honest answer to three questions: could an attacker reach research systems, how long would it take, and would anyone notice before the objective was met?

Project Scope
Objective-based red team operation targeting research data and laboratory systems across corporate IT.
Services Delivered
Adversary emulation, phishing and identity attacks, lateral movement, purple team debrief, detection engineering, retest
Industry
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech
“Their red team reached our research systems in under two weeks, and not one alert fired. Instead of a scare, we got a timeline, tuned detections, and a retest that proved the path was closed. It is the only offensive security work I have put in front of our board.”
Chief Technology Officer
Pharmaceuticals & Biotech company, name withheld
Solution

The Execution

Step 1

Define

We agreed on objectives covering research file shares, lab instrument networks, and the clinical data platform, plus rules of engagement and a small trusted contact group.

Step 2

Operate

A targeted phishing campaign delivered a foothold. The team escalated through misconfigured identity federation and moved laterally to research systems inside two weeks.

Step 3

Debrief

The full timeline was mapped against SOC telemetry, showing that no alert fired at any stage. The gaps sat in identity monitoring and lateral movement detection.

Step 4

Rebuild

In purple team sessions we built and tested new detections with the blue team, then re-ran the same techniques until each one fired and was actioned.

The Outcome

The company gained an evidence-based picture of real exposure and closed the identity and lateral movement blind spots the operation exposed. The retest confirmed the original attack path no longer works.

The engagement is now an annual exercise, and its report became the security section of the board's risk briefing.